Während England aus der EU austritt, investiert eine Firma aus dem EU-Mitgliedstaat Estland in Sachsen – dank Geldgebern aus Malaysia und einem Kredit von der Europäischen Investitionsbank. Die estnische Ministerin Urve Palo drückte am Mittwoch in Großröhrsdorf auf den Startknopf einer neuen Produktionsanlage. Von Ministerpräsident Stanislaw Tilllich (CDU) erfuhr sie auf Englisch, dass Sachsen das Land der Ingenieure ist und mit Auto- und Halbleiterfabriken wirbt. Dafür warb die estnische Ministerin für ihr hoch technisiertes Heimatland in ebenso gutem Englisch: In Estland könne vieles elektronisch erledigt werden, und niemand müsse mehr zum Unterschreiben irgendwo hinfahren. Esten und Deutsche seien ähnlich: „We like Ordnung.“ …
Background (see excerpt below): http://www.cascadecities.eu/cascadecities/city_profiles/cascade-cities%20/tartu
… Tartu city also joins the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) – Local Governments for Sustainability and the Aalborg Commitments. Preparatory work to compile a Sustainable Energy Action Plan (SEAP) for Tartu has already started and this is planned to be submitted in 2014. The Covenant of Mayors is due to be signed in 2013.
- Average 15-20% reduction of energy consumption in buildings
- At least 50% of city busses using biogas by 2017
- Achieve a 50% environmentally friendly public transport fleet
- 20-25% of all journeys made by bicycle ..
More see link above.
Tom Porter wrote for International Business Times: “The Estonian defence minister warned people not to join the vigilante Soldiers of Odin, after the anti-immigrant group announced plans to hold a torchlit procession through the capital Tallinn.
“Those eager to contribute to the security of the society should side with police voluntary helpers, which stand guard over the values of democratic society, have fulfilled the necessary training and have no criminal past,” Defence Minister Hannes Hanso said, Russia Today reported.” …
Comment by Estonia108:
“Soldiers of Odin” should learn Transcendental Meditation and the TM Sidhi-Program – then they could act as a Coherence Creating Group for Estonia generating a real, substantial influence of harmony, integration, peace and strength in the collective consciousness of the country. — Scientific validation:
Check it out:
Eesti kaitseks, a Facebook group – with the purpose of informing about the Maharishi Effect and the great value of coherence-creating groups – see https://www.facebook.com/groups/1591072491106788/
And a new a blog: eestikaitseks.org
“Remain free Estonian sea
Remain free Estonian shore
Storms may blow
But the Estonian heart will not be afraid.”
Eesti Kaitseks means “For the protection of Estonia”.
Recent article in the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (in German):
Fortschrittliches Estland – Zu Besuch in der Zukunft / Progressive Estonia – A Visit Into the Future
By Marie-Astrid Langer, Tallinn 27.2.2015, 05:30 Uhr
A very interesting, comprehensive report about the e-developments in Estonia since 1999.
At the end of the article you find an overview about the main political parties and their programs. This Sunday elections will take place.
Please use an online translator if necessary.
Home Textiles / “Young Creations Award: upcycling”
Goes to Estonia for the first time
More than ever, products in Upcycling are trendy – both in fashion and in interior design. With the “Young Creations Award: upcycling”, Heimtextil (a fair) in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, awarded for the third time a newcomer award, which is dedicated to the principle of sustainability. For the first time the prize was advertised all over Europe.
As winner Heimtextil selected on 14 January 2015 Kairi Katmann from Estonia.
“The issue of sustainability has been around for several years firmly anchored in the home textile industry, and it means to us much more than just a trend topic,” Ulrike Wechsung, Director of Heimtextil said during the awards ceremony.
Kairi Katmann from Estonia convinced the jury with their project “Storytellers” which is dedicated to the issue of pre-consumer waste. ….
CGI in collaboration with the IT and Development Center of the
Estonian Ministry of the Interior, the Estonian Emergency Response
Center, the Estonian Rescue Board and the Estonian Health Board has
developed and implemented an innovative emergency response system
designed to dramatically speed up response times and save lives.
At the heart of the system is a user-friendly digital map, located
both in the control rooms of the Estonian Emergency Response Center
and also within rescue vehicles and ambulances. Real time data is fed
in from multiple mobile devices, and the system recommends the most
appropriate resources to respond to the emergency. The map displays
the scene of the incident, the fastest route there and the real time
location of available resources.
With this new system, the government and citizens of Estonia
expect to realize the following benefits:
– Faster identification of emergency scenes
– Faster and more efficient deployment of emergency resources
– More accurate emergency information
– Faster exchange of emergency information among first responders
– Faster arrival at the scene of an emergency
– Accurate geographical overview of emergency scene and assigned first
31C3: Internet elections can be manipulated
More and more nations count on Internet voting, despite negative experiences with voting machines and warnings by security researchers. At the 31C3 (link: www.ccc.de) these are showing that the current technology has little to fend off attackers.
At the recent CCC congress in Hamburg Alex Haldermann of the University of Michigan reported about various problems in Internet voting – including in Estonia. The hackers were faced with two challenges: First, they could not as in previous tests investigate manipulable voting machines offline – and transform them, for example, into a Pacman machine. Secondly, interventions to ongoing online elections are sensitive. “As a security researcher you can not simply hack into a server during an election,” Halderman said. Too big is the risk that you would so sabotage a democratic election result.
But during a test run of a scheduled online election in Washington, the researchers were able to take control of the entire election data center and in this way to convince the authorities of the system imperfections. Because Estonia does not perform such tests, Haldermann’s team confines itself to an external analysis of the processes at the first independent study of Internet voting.
The electoral process in the Baltic States is complex: The the voter should remain anonymous to the online voting system and at the same time have the opportunity to verify the correctness of his vote. The Estonian officials have therefore chosen a digital two-envelope solution that is similar to the classic absentee ballot: A signature ensures that the vote actually comes from an electorate. The votes are counted but only if the votes are exempt from the personal signatures. The verification works via a mobile app that allows citizens to see their voting results again and to even change them. This is to prevent votes sale, but would also allow a Trojan which was foisted to a citizen to change the vote afterwards.
Haldermann’s team found several key weaknesses in the system: for instance the counting computer is giving merely the result of the election and does not sufficiently document, how it came about. Although the responsible parties have taken many security measures to protect the counting computer, but according to Haldermann these hardly withstand a serious attack of an state aggressor.
Thus, the security researchers discovered plenty of evidence of inadequate operational safety in the YouTube channel of the election officials of Estonia. Gaps are lurking in both the clients and the servers: so the central (or key) signatures were created on an obviously privately used computer, and in the videos you can see the access codes of the wireless network of the developers, and one video even shows the key to the server room sufficiently sharp to be able create a duplicate. During a vodka-soaked night a responsible was said to even even betray a key password.
But state organizations such as NSA might also try to compromise the counting maschine – either on the way from the manufacturer or by manipulated download images for the operating system. References to such concepts Edward Snowden delivered it was said.
Experts recommend Estonia to return to paper ballots
12th May 2014
Estonia is the first and only country that allows internet voting in political elections and referendums. Researchers now indicate fundamental risks.
Just two weeks before the European elections occurred, an international team of independent IT security experts addressed the public and pointed out fundamental risks in Estonian internet voting system. The experts consider the security flaws so serious that they recommend to put the system out of service immediately and return to elections with paper ballots.
Estonia is the first and only country that allows internet voting in political elections and referendums. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of the voters make use of this possibility. Developed by domestic firms the system is used in national and local elections and is to be used also in the European elections on 25 May 2014.
Lax security function, sufficient transparency
The arrangements for functional safety are lax, contradictory, are not sufficiently transparent for credible count and also as the software shows serious gaps against attacks from the outside, is the verdict of the team around Alex Halderman at the University of Michigan as well as the security researcher Harri Hursti, Jason Kitcat of the Open Rights Group and the election observer Maggie MacAlpine. All four had participated as election observers in the Estonian local elections last year.
“We have seen no closed, fully documented procedure for the care of the backend systems for these online elections,” Hursti complained. “These computers can be easily infiltrated by criminals or foreign hackers and undermine the security of the entire system.” Critical software would be downloaded via unsecured Internet connections, secret passwords and PINs under the supervision of video cameras would be given and the distribution of voting software be made to the citizens on unsecured computers.
“The Estonian Internet voting system blindly trusts the choice of servers and computers of voters,” Alex Halderman sums up his criticism; ‘both could present an attractive target to state attackers”. Together with two graduate students, the e-voting expert modeled at the University of Michigan the Estonian electoral system with the software used in the elections in 2013 in the laboratory by its own account and studied various attack scenarios. In a scenario they succeeded to unnoticedly steal votes with malware on the computer of the voter in spite of the protection by electronic ID card and smart phone verification. With another scenario it could be shown, Halderman reported, that malware attacks on the counting server could be possible which would influence the official results in the desired manner. The results of the tests will be published on a dedicated website. (Richard Sietmann)